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STALLMAN V. YOUNGQUIST. THE ILLINOIS SUPREME
COURT REJECTS MATERNAL CIVIL LIABILITY
INTRODUCTION

The Illinois Supreme Court, in Stallman v. Youngquist,' recently addressed a fetus's right to sue its mother for the unintentional infliction of
prenatal injuries. The court refused to recognize any such cause of action,
a refusal which may shock those who have fervently written for the imposition of maternal civil and criminal liability for a woman's prenatal acts.2

1. 125 11. 2d 267, 531 N.E.2d 355 (1988).
2. For a discussion on imposing maternal civil liability, see Beal, "Can I Sue Mommy?"
An Analysis of a Woman's Tort Liability for Prenatal Injuries to the Child Born Alive, 21
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 325 (1984) (arguing that the expanding legal status of the fetus and the
increasing trend to abrogate state parent-child tort immunity doctrines forms the basis for
allowing a fetus to sue its parents for negligence); Shaw, Conditional Prospective Rights of a
Fetus, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 63 (1984) (asserting that once a woman has decided to carry a
pregnancy to term the inference in Roe is that she then incurs liability for any negligent harm
inflicted upon the fetus); Comment, Parental Liability for Preconception Negligence: Do
Parents Owe a Legal Duty to Their Potential Children?, 22 CALIF. L. REV. 289 (1986)
[hereinafter Comment, Parental Liability for Preconception Negligence] (concluding that recognition of a child-parent cause of action for preconception negligence is necessary and
proper).
For a discussion on imposing criminal liability, see Comment, Criminal Liability of a
Prospective Mother For Prenatal Neglect of a Viable Fetus, 9 WHITTIER L. REv. 363 (1987)
[hereinafter Comment, Criminal Liability of a Prospective Mother] (concluding that a viable
fetus possesses the same rights and protections as all human beings and therefore proposing
that criminal liability should be imposed upon a pregnant mother who arbitrarily and needlessly
endangers the health and safety of her viable fetus); Note, Parental Liability for Prenatal
Injury, 14 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 47 (1978) [hereinafter Note, Parental Liability] (supporting the imposition of civil liability on parents once they are or should be aware of
pregnancy); Note; Developing Maternal Liability Standards For Prenatal Injury, 61 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 592 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Developing Maternal Liability Standards] (concluding
that a child's right to be born healthy justifies the imposition of a duty on a pregnant woman
to refrain from injurious conduct and recommending the imposition of both maternal civil
and criminal liability).
But see Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions & Interventions: What's Wrong With Fetal Rights,
10 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 9 (1987) (state has no basis for imposing criminal or civil liability
on women for their prenatal acts); Singer, Maternal Smoking and Fetal Injury: Medical,
Legal, and Societal Consequences, 21 J. HEALTH & Hosp. L. 153 (July, 1988) (concluding that
it is unlikely that any court could impose judicial sanctions for such a widespread practice as
smoking); Note, The Pamela Rae Stewart Case and Fetal Harm: Prosecution or Prevention,
II HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 227 (1988) [hereinafter Note, The Pamela Rae Stewart Case] (discusses
California's unsuccessful attempt to impose criminal liability for a woman's prenatal acts and
explains why criminalization is not the solution); Note, A Maternal Duty to Protect Fetal
Health?, 58 IND. L.J. 531 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Maternal Duty?] (practical considerations
require that courts deny absolute enforcement of a maternal duty).
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By tracing the development of fetal rights over the past one hundred years,
proponents for imposing maternal liability have concluded that "logic and
justice" demand such a result.' However, in refusing to recognize the fetus's
cause of action, the Stallman court cautioned that such an action would
have far-reaching implications for women's constitutional rights. The court
concluded that to recognize such fetal rights and correlative maternal duties
would make the woman the guarantor of her child's mind and body.4 Thus,
mother and child would be legal adversaries from the moment of conception
until birth.' The Stallman v. Youngquist opinion addresses several major
issues. First, although the court recognized that a fetus may assert a right
to be born whole against a third party, it refused to recognize such rights
against the mother. 6 The court concluded that the fetus was not an entirely
separate legal entity from its mother, and therefore reasoned that the fetus's
legal status did not include the right to assert a legal claim against its
mother. 7 Second, the court addressed the issue of whether the mother has
a legal duty to the fetus. The court refused to recognize such a common
law duty, and instead deferred the maternal civil liability issue to the
legislature.' Last, the court addressed the potential conflict between a
woman's privacy rights and a fetus's right to be born whole. The court
expressed concern for potentially excessive state intrusion into women's
everyday lives if the court recognized such a cause of action.9 In addressing
this concern, the court discussed broad policy issues, including the protection
of women's rights and the state's interest in protecting the fetus. The court
stated these policy issues could serve as guidelines for any legislative action.' 0
However, the court stressed prevention rather than imposition of civil
liability as the sounder course, and stated the way to effectuate the birth
of healthy babies was not through after-the-fact civil liability in tort, but
rather through before-the-fact education of all women and their families."
This Note will trace the historical expansion of fetal rights from the
original common law rule preventing recovery for prenatal negligence to

3. Advocates of imposing maternal civil and criminal liability argue that such liability is
the logical extension of the trend to expand fetal rights and to abrogate parent-child tort
immunity doctrines.
4. Stallman v. Youngquist, 125 I1. 2d 267, 276, 531 N.E.2d 355, 358 (1988).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 275-76, 531 N.E.2d at 359. The court concluded that if a fetus's right to a sound
mind and body were asserted against its mother, the mother would become the guarantor of
the child's mind and body. The court noted that a legal duty to guarantee the mental and
physical health of another has never been recognized in law. Id.
7. Id. at 278-79, 531 N.E.2d at 360.
8. Id. at 279-80, 531 N.E.2d at 361. While the court deferred to the legislature, it stressed
that any such legislative decision must come only after thorough investigation, study and
debate because of the far-reaching implications on a woman's right to privacy and autonomy.
9. Id.at 277-78, 531 N.E.2d at 360-61.
10. Id.at 280, 351 N.E.2d at 361.
11. Id. at 279-80, 531 N.E.2d at 361.
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the current rule which allows recovery for prenatal injury from third party
tortfeasors. Because the Stallman court analyzed a case of first impression,
this Note will draw analogies from cases which attempted to impose criminal
liability on mothers for prenatal fetal injury. Furthermore, the Note will
identify the competing rights and interests involved in maternal liability and
will draw analogies from appropriate case law addressing fetal rights, women's
constitutional rights, and the state's interest in the fetus. The Note will also
discuss the Stallman decision's effect on women's privacy, fetal well-being,
and maternal criminal liability.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

Historical Trends in the Fetus's Legal Status

1. No Common Law Recognition for a Cause of Action for Prenatal
Negligence
A hundred years ago, a fetus was considered a part of its mother. In
Dietrich v. Northhampton,2 Justice Holmes held that there was no common
law recognition of a cause of action in tort for prenatal injuries. This denial
was based on the belief that the fetus was merely a part of the mother at
the time of injury. 3 In Illinois, this common law rule was enunciated in
Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 4 where the Illinois Supreme Court held that
no cause of action existed for injuries to a fetus even though the injuries
occurred only a few days prior to birth. In Allaire, a pregnant woman was
injured in a hospital elevator and sustained multiple fractures. The infant
was born fourdays later with the left side of his body severely bruised and
atrophied resulting in permanent left-sided paralysis.' 5 The court refused to
6
recognize the cause of action, stating that the fetus was a part of its mother.'
A dissenting opinion in Allaire later became highly influential in reversing
the common law rule preventing recovery for prenatal negligence. 7 In his
dissent, Justice Boggs suggested that it was an obvious fallacy to conclude
that no injury had occurred to the person of the fetus. 8 Justice Boggs
concluded that a child should have a cause of action in negligence whenever

12. 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
13. Id. at 16.

14.
15.
16.
and is

184 Il. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
Id. at 362, 56 N.E. at 639.
Id. at 368, 56 N.E. at 640. "That a child before birth is, in fact, a part of the mother
only severed from her at birth, cannot, we think, be successfully disputed." Id.

17. The following cases relied on Justice Boggs's dissent as the basis for changing the
Dietrich rule: Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946); Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch,
197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951); Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951);

Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949).
18. Allaire, 184 Ill. at 374, 56 N.E. at 642 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
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a child was injured in uterQ and was so far advanced as to be viable.' 9
2.

Common Law Recognition of a Prenatal Negligence Claim Against

Third Parties
The common law rule prohibiting prenatal negligence claims was followed
until 1946. In 1946i the District Court for the District of Columbia, in
Bonbrest v. Kotz, 20 recognized a cause of action for prenatal injuries inflicted
by a third party on a viable fetus, subsequently born alive. 2 1 After Bonbrest,
the majority of jurisdictions reversed their earlier holdings and allowed a
22
cause of action for prenatal injury.
The Bonbrest court articulated two requirements for establishing a claim.
First, the child had to be born alive, and second, the injury must have
occurred after viability.2" Subsequent court decisions, however, slowly eroded
these requirements. 2 4 Presently, thirty-five jurisdictions do not require the
"born alive" element. 25 These jurisdictions reasoned that the born alive
requirement more harshly punished a tortfeasor who merely caused injuries
than a tortfeasor who caused fetal demise. 26 Furthermore, several states,
including Illinois, have abandoned the viability requirement as an artificial
27
demarcation.

19. Id.
20. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
21. Id. at 142.
22. Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael & Sons, Inc., 208 Ga. 201, 65 S.E.2d 909 (1951);
Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951); Verkennes v. Gorniea, 229 Minn.
35, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949); Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951); Jasinsky
v. Potts, 153 Ohio 529, 92 N.E.2d 809 (1951).
23. 65 F. Supp. 138, 142 (D.D.C. 1946). The Bonbrest court defined a viable child as
"one capable of living outside the womb." The Supreme Court, in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 160, (1972), defined viability as the point at which a fetus is potentially able to live
outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid. The Supreme Court recognized viability
as generally occurring at twenty-eight weeks, but noted it could occur as early as twenty-four
weeks.
24. Eventually, the born alive requirement was eliminated as being unfair because it allowed
the tortfeasor who actually caused fetal death to escape liability. See Eich v. Town of Gulf
Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 300 So. 2d 354 (1974); Summerfield v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 467,
698 P.2d 712 (1985) (en banc); Greater Southeast Community Hosp. v. Williams, 482 A.2d
394 (D.C. 1984); Volk v. Baldazo, 103 Idaho 570, 651 P.2d 11 (1982); Mone v. Greyhound
Lines Inc., 368 Mass. 354, 331 N.E.2d 916 (1975); Pehrson v. Kistner, 301 Minn. 299, 222
N.W.2d 334 (1974); Vaillancourt v. Medical Center Hosp., 139 Vt. 138, 425 A.2d 92 (1980).
25. See Note, Developing Maternal Liability Standards, supra note 2, at 595 n.14.
26. Id. at 595.
27. See, e.g. Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Il. 2d 348, 353, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1253
(1977); Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 352 Mass. 446, 448-49, 225 N.E.2d 926, 927 (1977);
Simon v. Mullin, 34 Conn. Supp. 139, 147, 380 A.2d 1353, 1357 (Super. Ct. 1977). In Renslow,
the court noted that the viability requirement was an artificial and unsatisfactory criterion
because viability was a relative matter which depended on the race, weight, and stage of fetal
development, the health of the mother and the child, and the available life-sustaining techniques. 67 I1. 2d at 352, 367 N.E.2d at 1252. The standard of what constitutes. viability for
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It was not until 1953 that the Illinois Supreme Court, in Amann v.
Faidy,25 overruled the Allaire holding and recognized a child's cause of
action for prenatal negligence. In Amann, the court noted that many legal

scholars had decried the illogical basis for denying prenatal negligence
actions: 29 Relying on these scholarly studies, and on case law subsequent to
Allaire, the court concluded that the reasons which had been advanced in
support of the doctrine of nonliability were unpersuasive.3 0 Furthermore,
the court rejected problems of proof as a legitimate basis for denying a
cause of action, and overturned Allaire.31 The same year Amann was
decided, the Illinois Supreme Court also upheld an action for prenatal
negligence for injuries sustained by a viable fetus and subsequently born
child. 2

Twenty years later, Illinois abandoned the necessity of a live birth before
allowing a prenatal negligence claim. In Chrisafogeorgis v. &ndenberg, 33
the Illinois Supreme Court held a wrongful death action could be maintained

on behalf of a stillborn child. Relying on the Amann decision, the court
concluded that difficulty in determining
damages should not operate as a
34

legal bar to a cause of action.
In eliminating the live birth requirement, the court looked to other

jurisdictions which found it was illogical to permit a cause of action to a
subsequently born child but to deny a prenatal negligence claim where the
injury was so significant that it caused fetal death.35 Thus, the court

tort purposes is essentially the same as was articulated in Roe. As medical technology pushes
viability back to earlier prenatal periods, the available time period for abortion may change.
It was because of this changing standard of viability that some courts, including those in
Illinois, decided that the viability requirement was an artificial and unnecessary standard.
28. 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953).
29. Id. at 427, 114 N.E.2d at 415.
30. Id. at 432, 114 N.E.2d at 416. The primary reasons for preventing recovery were the
lack of precedent, the difficulty of determining the existence of a causal relationship, and the
absence of a duty to the unborn child. The court concluded there was case law recognizing
fetal rights in certain circumstances, such as the will and inheritance cases, as well as certain
admiralty laws. Second, the difficulty in determining proof did not preclude a remedy, and
should prompt greater leniency in allowing a claim. Finally, the court believed that concluding
a viable fetus had no separate existence would be to deny a simple and easily demonstrable
fact.- Id.
"31. Id. at 432, 114 N.E.2d at 417-18. The court, therefore, overturned Allaire and permitted
a wrongful death action of an infant born alive but who died due to a prenatal injury by a
third party.
32. Rodriquez v. Patti, 415 Ill. 946, 114 N.E.2d 721 (1953). The plaintiff sought to recover
for prenatal injuries. The trial court dismissed, and the appellate court affirmed based on
Allaire. However, since the Illinois Supreme Court overruled Allaire in Amann, Rodriguez
was reversed and remanded.
33. 55 Ill. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973).
34. Id. at 372, 304 N.E.2d at 90.
35. Id. at 373-75, 304 N.E.2d at 91-92. The court quoted from one jurisdiction which had
stated that they were "unable to reconcile the two propositions, that if the death occurred
after birth there is a cause of action, but that if it occurred before birth there is none," and
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concluded that "logic" required the recognition of a cause of action for
the wrongful death of a stillborn, as well as the death of an infant.3 6
Additionally, the Chrisafogeoris court noted that a significant reason for
allowing a wrongful death cause of action for the death of a stillborn child
was the fetus's existence separate and independent of its mother." The
court found that the elimination of the live birth requirement was not only
consistent with the Amann holding, but a "reasonable and natural devel38

opment of the holding."
Four years after the Chrisafogeoris case, the Illinois Supreme Court
addressed yet another novel issue in the recognition of prebirth negligence.
In Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital,39 the court not only eliminated the
viability requirement, but expanded liability to the preconception phase. In
Renslow, the hospital and physician negligently transfused a thirteen year
old girl with Rh positive blood. The girl, who had Rh negative blood, was
sensitized by the transfusions, but only learned of it as an adult and after
she became pregnant. Her infant was born with permanent brain and central
40
nervous system damage as a result of the sensitization.
4
In a closely divided opinion, 1 the court recognized the preconception
negligence action for two reasons. First, it held that the defendant had a
"contingent prospective duty" to the future born child. 42 Second, the court

another jurisdiction which stated that "if no right of action is allowed there is a wrong
inflicted for which there is no remedy." Id. (quoting Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431,
434, 167 N.E.2d 106, 108 (1959) and Kwaterski v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis.
2d 14, 20, 148 N.W.2d 107, 110 (1967)).
36. Id. at 374, 304 N.E.2d at 91.
37. Id. at 372, 304 N.E.2d at 91.
38. Id. at 374, 304 N.E.2d at 91. However, Justice Ryan's dissent strongly disagreed that
the elimination of the live birth requirement was a "reasonable and natural development" of
the Amann holding. The dissent contained the initial seeds of judicial restraint in the fetal
rights movement and foreshadowed the Stallman opinion. Justice Ryan disagreed with the
majority's interpretation of Illinois's Wrongful Death Statute and maintained that the fetus
was not intended to be covered by the statute. Id. at 377, 304 N.E.2d at 92 (Ryan, J.,
dissenting). He also argued that by eliminating the live birth requirement and only requiring
viability, the court had created a much less certain yardstick for measuring the validity of a
claim. Live birth was a precise and observable occurrence, the Justice noted, while viability
was "uncertain, indefinite and depends upon several factors other than the length of pregnancy." Id. at 376, 304 N.E.2d at 92. Additionally, Justice Ryan predicted that viability
would soon be discarded as a measurement of the validity of a claim. In fact, this occurred
four years later in Renslow. Justice Ryan objected to the expansion of "fetal rights," noting
that in areas other than criminal abortion, the law had been reluctant to endorse any theory
that life begins before live birth or to accord legal rights to the unborn. Id. at 380, 304 N.E.2d
at 94-95.
39. 67 11. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977). Renslow prompted many legal scholars to call
for the imposition of maternal civil and criminal liability for prenatal injury.
40. Id. at 349-50, 367 N.E.2d at 1251.
41. Three justices joined in the plurality opinion, one justice wrote a concurring opinion
and three justices joined in the dissent.
42. Id. at 355-59, 367 N.E.2d at 1254-55.
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reasoned that because routine blood typing had been an established practice
for fifteen years, and it had been recognized that an Rh positive fetus of
an Rh negative mother who was previously sensitized was at "high risk,"
the injury to the child was foreseeable. 3
The court discussed duty and foreseeability at length, and emphasized
that they were not identical in scope. Specifically, the court stated that
although foreseeability aids a court in determining negligence, the duty
question was one of law to be determined by the judge. 44 In finding "a
contingent prospective duty," the majority stressed that "duty is not sacrosanct in itself, but is only an expression of the sum total of those
considerations of policy which leave the law to say that the particular
' 45
plaintiff is entitled to protection.
The court concluded that there was a right to be born free from prenatal
injury foreseeably caused by a breach of duty to the child's mother.4 6 In
countering the defendant's assertion that recognizing such a claim would
lead to perpetual liability, the court expressed confidence that the judiciary
would "effectively exercise its traditional role of drawing rational distinctions, consonant with current perceptions of justice, between harms which
are compensable and those which are not." ' 47 In this case, however, the
majority maintained that "logic and sound policy" required finding a legal
4
duty. 1
Justice Ryan wrote a strong dissent criticizing the court's judicial activism
as a reflection of an increasing tendency to expand the traditional limits of
tort liability with little regard for the resulting social consequences. 49 Specifically, Justice Ryan criticized the majority for basing its opinion on
foreseeability and causation alone, and instead suggested that Prosser's
approach, wherein duty was largely shaped by judicial determinations of
the community's mores, 0 should be adopted. Additionally, Justice Ryan
disagreed with the court's reasoning that their conclusion was appropriately

43. Id. at 353-54, 367 N.E.2d at 1253.
44. Id. at 367-69, 367 N.E.2d at 1260 (Dooley, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 356, 367 N.E.2d at 1254 (quoting W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 53, at 325-26
(4th.ed. 1971 )).
46. Id. at 357, 367 N.E.2d at 1255.
47. Id. at 358, 367 N.E.2d at 1255. This quote later provided support for the Stallman
court's decision to draw the line on perpetual liability.
48. Id. at 359, 367 N.E.2d at 1255.
49. Id. at 378, 367 N.E.2d at 1265 (Ryan, J., dissenting). Again, Justice Ryan's dissent
foreshadowed the Stallman v. Youngquist decision.
50. Id. at 375, 367 N.E.2d at 1263. See also Prosser, PalsgrafRevisited, 52 MICH. L. REV.
1, 15 (1953) (the court will decide whether there is a duty based on the mores of the community).
Ryan also noted that the public was openly seeking limits to the expansion of tort liability
through legislative measures, modification of judicially created law or the adoption of a no
fault system of compensation. Nevertheless, Justice Ryan believed the court ignored this public
outcry. 67 I11.2d at 379, 367 N.E.2d at 1266.
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based on "logic" and "policy." He stressed the notion that "the life of
the law has not been logic, it has been experience."'"
Furthermore, Justice Ryan believed that this was the case for the court
to establish limits of liability "short of the freakish and the fantastic." 52
He expressed doubts about the majority's conclusion that a future court
would prevent far-reaching liability by drawing the line on the appropriate
case. Instead, he believed that a future court, armed with the decision,
could simply take one more "logical" step down the slippery slope to
53
absolute liability.
3. Common Law Recognition of a Prenatal Negligence Cause of Action
Against the Mother
Renslow was the last Illinois Supreme Court case to address a prenatal
or preconception negligence issue until Stallman v. Youngquist. In the ten
year interim, one national case allowed a fetus to assert a cause of action
against its mother.5 4 Further, during this interim there were additional cases
which sought to extend fetal rights protection in other circumstances.55
Grodin v. Grodin 6 a Michigan appellate court decision, was the case to
impose civil liability on a mother for her actions during pregnancy. In
Grodin, the child, and the child's father as plaintiff and next friend, filed
suit against the mother for negligently taking tetracycline while pregnant.
The suit charged that the mother's negligence resulted in the child developing
teeth that were permanently discolored. 7 The trial court granted summary
judgment for the defendant based on an exception to the general abrogation
of the parent child tort immunity doctrine. 58

51. Id. at 376, 367 N.E.2d at 1264 (quoting 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1923)).
52. Id. at 372, 367 N.E.2d at 1264. Justice Ryan believed the decision abrogated the
unquestionable rule of law that "negligence inthe air,
so to speak, will
not do." Id. (quoting
F. POLLOCK, TORTS 361 (14th ed. 1939)). He maintained that a duty of care owed to an entity
not in existence would be the classic illustration of "negligence in the air." Id.
53. Id.at 377, 367 N.E.2d at 1265.
54. See infra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
55. Fetal protection has been afforded in cases where a woman's prenatal conduct was
used as the basis for abuse and neglect proceedings. See, e.g., In re Baby X, 97 Mich. App.
Ill, 293 N.W.2d 736 (1980); In re Smith, 128 Misc. 2d 976, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331 (N.Y. Fam.
Ct. 1985). Inother cases, the woman's prenatal conduct formed the basis for criminal charges
related to the fetus's death. See, e.g., Reyes v. California, 75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 141 Cal.
Rptr. 912 (1976).

56. 102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869 (1980).
57. Id . at 398, 301 N.W.2d at 869.
58. Id. The parental tort immunity doctrine isan American common law doctrine originating inthe late1800s. See Beal, supra note 2,at 333-57 (in-depth discussion of the historical
development of the doctrine and itscurrent modern day status).
The doctrine of parental immunity prevents a child from suing his or her parent for personal
injuries arising from a negligent or intentional act. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 122, at
865 (4th ed. 1971). The doctrine ispremised on the belief that ifa child were allowed to sue
a parent for a personal tort itwould disrupt family harmony, encourage collusion and fraud,
and impair parental authority and discipline. Stallman v. Youngquist, 152 Il1.
App. 3d 683,
504 N.E.2d 920 (IstDist. 1987), rev'd, 125 Ill.
2d 267, 531 N.E.2d 355 (1988).
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The appellate court reversed and concluded that the woman was civilly
liable. This conclusion was based on the Michigan Supreme Court decision
5 9
in Womack v. Buckhorn,
which allowed a common law action for negligently inflicted prenatal injury. The court noted that the Womack decision
did not limit who could be liable for prenatal negligence, but only specified
that a child had an action for prenatal negligence for the wrongful conduct
of others. 60 Therefore, the appellate court concluded, without further analysis, that the litigating child's mother would bear 6the same liability for
injurious negligent conduct as would a third person. '
4.

Maternal Criminal Liability Cases Analogized to Civil Liability

The common law rule regarding the imposition of maternal civil liability
is limited to the Grodin case, an analysis rejected by the Illinois Supreme
Court. Therefore, an examination of criminal liability cases may provide a
62
useful analogy for considering the imposition of maternal civil liability.
Several cases have attempted to impose criminal liability on the mother for
her prenatal acts, 63 and some states impose criminal charges for drug use
on women who subsequently deliver infants with symptoms suggestive of
exposure to drug ingestion. 64 In both instances, the infant's condition at
birth is used as evidence of the mother's criminal conduct during the prenatal
period .65

59. 384 Mich. 718, 187 N.W.2d 218 (1971).
60. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. at 400, 301 N.W.2d at 870.
61. Id. The Grodin court's opinion has been assailed by some as lacking analysis. See
Stallman v. Youngquist, 125 I11.2d 267, 531 N.E.2d 355 (1987) (court found Grodin unpersuasive because the Grodin court failed to address any of the profound implications of its
holding.); Note, A Maternal Duty?, supra note 2, at 536 (asserting that the Grodin opinion
is completely lacking in analysis).
62. Many commentators who support imposing maternal liability suggest that both civil
and criminal liability be imposed. This suggestion implies that the legal basis for imposing
civil liability is the same as for imposing criminal liability. If this is the logic, it is interesting
to note that to date no woman has been held criminally liable for her prenatal acts and
resulting effects on her fetus. See sources cited supra note 2.
63. See, e.g., Reyes v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1977);
People v. Stewart, No. M508197, slip op. (San Diego Mun. Ct. Feb. 26, 1987).
64. See, e.g., Plan Would Jail "Fetal Abusers," NAT'L L.J., Nov. 21, 1988, at 3, col. 1.
(county using newborns' urine tests to prosecute mothers for illegal drug abuse); Sherman,
Keeping Baby Safe From Mom, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 3, 1988, at 1, col. 1. (article discusses
national trend to impose criminal liability on women who are known drug abusers).
65. The use of a woman's prenatal conduct for the imposition of liability and its infringement of a woman's rights formed the basis for the Illinois Supreme Court's rejection of
imposing civil maternal liability in Stallman v. Youngquist, 125 I11.2d 267, 531 N.E.2d 355
(1988). Those who oppose the imposition of criminal liability for a woman's prenatal acts
maintain that such actions will turn the prenatal care and delivery system to a police force
and will not result in better fetal health. See Sherman, supra note 64, at 24, col. 4. Other
opponents of criminal maternal liability argue that state intervention in pregnancy poses serious
problems of discrimination, invasion of privacy and lack of due process. See Plan Would Jail
"Fetal Abusers," supra note 64, at 24, col. 3.
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To date, two California cases have unsuccessfully sought to impose

criminal sanctions on a woman for her prenatal conduct. In Reyes v.
California,66 the defendant was a heroin addict who failed to obtain prenatal
care and continued her heroin abuse throughout her pregnancy. She gave
birth to twin boys who exhibited symptoms of heroin withdrawal shortly

after their birth. The woman was charged with two counts of felony child

endangerment. 67 The Reyes court concluded that the word "child" was not
intended to refer to an unborn child and therefore defendant's actions did
68
not constitute felonious child endangerment.

Another unsuccessful attempt to impose criminal liability for a woman's

prenatal acts occurred eleven years later in People v. Stewart.6 9 The facts
of the Stewart case suggest how ignorance, misunderstanding, and inadequate prenatal care can lead to disastrous results. 70 Defendant's husband
worked only sporadically, while Stewart herself had only an eleventh grade
education. Additionally, the couple and their two children moved frequently.
As a result, Stewart obtained very little prenatal care during her third
pregnancy. In her eighth month of pregnancy, Stewart experienced vaginal
bleeding and pain. She was diagnosed as having placenta previa, a condition

with potentially fatal implications for both mother and child. 7'
Stewart was hospitalized overnight and was discharged with instructions
to stay off her feet, avoid sexual intercourse, and to take medicine to stop

66. 75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1977).
67. Id. at 216, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 913. Reyes was charged under § 237a(l) of the California
Penal Code which made it a felony for "[a]ny person who, under circumstances or conditions
likely to produce great bodily harm or death . . . having the care or custody of any child,
• . . wilfully causes or permits such child to be placed in such situation that its person or
health is endangered." CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a(1) (West Supp. 1988).
68. 75 Cal. App. 3d at 219, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 914-15. The Reyes court noted that when
the legislature intended to include fetuses within a penal statute it had done so expressly. Since
there was no express inclusion of fetuses within the statute, the court would not interpret the
statute to apply to the unborn. Id. at 219, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 915.
69. People v. Stewart, No. M508197, slip op. (San Diego Mun. Ct. Feb. 26, 1987).
70. The facts of the Stewart case are discussed more fully in Note, The Pamela Rae
Stewart Case, supra note 2, at .227. The author suggests that Ms. Stewart did not understand
the severity of her condition and that this caused her lack of compliance. Stewart maintained
that she knew she needed a caesarean section, but believed it was because the baby was in a
breech position. She claimed that no one at the hospital told her that her condition was more
serious. Id. at 228. This misunderstanding, and a lack of regular prenatal care, contributed
to the unfortunate results.
Women with less than a high school education are not as likely to be aware of the potential
prenatal complications that can arise. See Oxford, Schinfeld, Elkins & Ryan, Deterrents to
Early Prenatal Care: A Comparison of Women Who Initiated Prenatal Care During the First
and Third Trimesters of Pregnancy, 78 TENN. MED. A. 691, 692-93. Additionally, limited
prenatal care is likely to result in less communication between a physician and a pregnant
woman, and increase the potential for complications. This fact, legal theorists argue, demonstrates that the imposition of criminal liability discriminates against the poor. See Sherman,
supra note 64, at 24, col.3.
71. See Note, The Pamela Rae Stewart Case, supra note 2, at 229.
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the bleeding. Twelve days later, she had intercourse with her husband and
admitted to "taking a puff of a marijuana cigarette." She gave birth by
emergency cesarean section to a baby boy who was diagnosed as brain dead
72
at birth due to lack of oxygen.
Nine months later, Stewart was charged with contributing to the death
of her child. 73 The applicable statute made it a misdemeanor for a parent
to fail to provide necessary medical attention and other remedial care to a
minor child. However, the presiding judge concluded the legislative history
and intent of the statute suggested it was enacted to encourage parents to
provide their children with financial support. Therefore, the judge concluded
the statute was not intended to apply to the case at hand and declined to
74
impose a duty upon a pregnant woman.
Thus, to date no state has successfully imposed criminal liability on a
woman for her prenatal acts, and only one state appellate court has imposed
civil liability on a woman for her prenatal acts. Additionally, there is no
case law that establishes a precedent for imposing maternal liability except
for Grodin v. Grodin.75 Nonetheless, legal scholars have continued to argue
for the imposition of maternal civil and criminal liability. 76 Since the imposition of maternal liability is not established in the common law, fetal
rights proponents have utilized cases involving prenatal negligence of third
parties, cases involving women's rights to privacy and cases involving the
77
state's interest in fetal health and well-being to support their position.
Therefore, a background discussion on the imposition of civil maternal
liability must include case law highlighting the underlying competing rights
and interests involved in imposing maternal liability.
B.
1.

Competing Rights and Interests

The Fetus's Right to be Born Whole

The expansion of the fetus's legal status has led fetal rights proponents
to assert that a woman should be held civilly and criminally liable for her

72. Id.
73. Stewart was charged with contributing to the death of her son under § 270 of the
California Penal Code, which provides:
If a parent of a minor child wilfully omits, without lawful excuse, to furnish
necessary clothing food, shelter or medical attendance or other remedial care for
his or her child, he or she is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not
exceeding two thousand dollars ($2,000) or by imprisonment in the county jail not
exceeding one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1988).
74. See Note, The Pamela Rae Stewart Case, supra note 2, at 230. After the Stewart case,
California Senator Royce introduced an amendment to the child endangerment statute which
included the words "or fetus" after each instance of "child" within the statute. He was
ultimately forced by his opponents to withdraw the bill. Id. at 231 n.34.
75. 102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869 (1980).
76. See sources cited supra note 2.
77. See infra notes 78-142 and accompanying text.
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prenatal acts. 78 The aforesaid expansion of fetal rights was fostered by the
belief that a fetus has a right to begin life with a sound mind and body.7 9
This right was first enunciated in Smith v. Brennan,80 and has led to the
erosion of the Bonbrest criteria of live birth and viability.' This erosion
has resulted in increased liability for prenatal negligence. 2 Courts argued
that the criteria of viability or a live birth frustrated the fetus's right to be
born whole, and eventually these factors gave way to the "logic and justice"
that such a right demands. Commentators asserted that the fetus's right to
a sound mind and body, coupled with the trend toward abrogation of the
parent-child tort immunity doctrine, laid the groundwork for the imposition
of both civil and criminal maternal liability.8" However, some authors
contend that the Smith holding has been misconstrued and that there is no
4
common law or constitutional right to be born whole.
The belief that the fetus has a right to be born whole has encouraged
prenatal child abuse and neglect proceedings, thus providing further evidence
of the legal trend toward expanding fetal rights. This trend is noteworthy
because it reflects the courts' willingness to scrutinize a woman's prenatal
conduct. In In re Baby X,11 a Michigan probate court concluded that
evidence of neonatal heroin withdrawal was sufficient evidence of neglect
to justify taking temporary custody of the newborn. The court concluded
that since a child has a right to begin life with a sound mind and body, it
was in the best interest of the child to examine all prenatal conduct bearing
on that right.8 6 Therefore, the court held that evidence of prenatal drug
abuse was at least sufficient to support the state in taking temporary custody
817
of a child.
78. See sources cited supra note 2.
79. Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960).
80. 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960).
81. Id. at 364-65, 155 A.2d at 503.

82. See supra notes 21-53 and accompanying text.
83. See Note, ParentalLiability, supra note 2, at 90 (for the proposition that the "parents'
rights to autonomy should be limited when they conflict with the right of the child to be born
whole."). Another commentator favoring maternal liability reached the conclusion that there
was no legal obstacle to giving viable fetuses legal protection fully equivalent to that given
the newborn. Furthermore, this commentator urged that the woman's and the fetus's rights
be weighed equally to resolve the conflict. See King, The Juridical Status of the Fetus, 77
MICH. L. REv. 1647 (1981). But see Parness, Values & Legal Personhood: A Proposalfor
Logical Protection of the Unborn, 83 W. VA. L. REV. 487, 501 (1981) (discussion of the

consequences of equating the born with the unborn and its impact on human freedom and
the overall quality of life).
84. See Nelson, Buggy & Weil, Forced Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women: "Compelling Each To Live as Seems Good to the Rest," 37 HASTINGS L.J. 703, 735 (1986) [hereinafter
Nelson] (concluding that Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960), only holds that
a live born child has a right to recover damages for a prenatal injury and to claim that the
Smith holding stands for the proposition that everyone holds a legal duty to a fetus is to

"stretch the holding beyond recognition.").
85. 97 Mich. App. Il,
293 N.W.2d 736 (1980).
86. Id. at 115, 293 N.W.2d at 739.
87. Id. at 120-21, 293 N.W.2d at 741.
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Additionally, in In re Smith,88 a New York family court held that an
unborn child could be considered a person under the Family Court Act. In
Smith, the state initiated child neglect proceedings on behalf of a newborn
whose record indicated the child might have "fetal alcohol syndrome." The
court noted that at least one prior New York decision held that an excessive
use of drugs prior to birth would support a finding that a child was a
"neglected child." 89 While the court noted that the evidence was inadequate
to support a finding of fetal alcohol syndrome, the court nonetheless
concluded that the evidence of parental prenatal alcohol abuse was sufficient
to establish an "imminent danger" of impairment to the unborn child. 90
The above neglect cases conclude that a fetus has a right to a sound mind
and body, and therefore a court is justified in scrutinizing all prenatal
conduct bearing on that right. However, other courts have held that prenatal
acts cannot be used for determining child neglect, and that fetuses are not
protected under state child abuse and neglect statutes.
In In re Steven S.,91 a California court attempted to have a fetus declared
a dependent in order to confine a woman in a psychiatric institution. 92 A
juvenile court interpreted the state dependent child provisions as protecting
the fetus and ordered that the mother be detained. 93 The appellate court
reversed, reasoning that courts had not interpreted California statutes to
include fetuses within the meaning of the word person unless the legislature
had expressly provided for it.94 Similarly, a Michigan Court of Appeals held

that juvenile protection statutes did not apply to the unborn. In In re
Dittrick, 95 a woman became pregnant while child abuse charges against her
were pending. 96 The appellate court concluded that while it was possible
that the statutory use of the word child included fetuses, it was not the
legislature's intent to do so in this particular statute. 97 Thus, although fetal
rights proponents argue that the fetus's right "to be born whole" renders
child abuse and neglect statutes applicable, this assertion is not unanimously
supported by the courts.98 The proponents for imposing maternal liability
also suggest that such activities as eating, smoking, drinking alcohol, using
medication, engaging in sexual intercourse, and working may pose a danger
to the fetus and thus infringe on its right to be born whole. 99 In light of
this, these proponents maintain that the state has a legitimate interest in

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

128 Misc. 2d 976, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1985).
Id.
Id. at 979, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 334.
126 Cal. App. 3d 23, 178 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1981).
Id.
Id. at 27, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 526.
Id. at 29, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 528.
80 Mich. App. 219, 263 N.W.2d 37 (1977).
Id. at 221, 263 N.W.2d at 38.
Id. at 223, 263 N.W.2d at 39.
See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
See Note, Parental Liability, supra note 2, at 73-75.
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scrutinizing all of a woman's prenatal conduct and in imposing civil and
criminal liability to protect fetal rights. However, there are numerous constitutional issues involved in regulating a woman's prenatal conduct and in
using that conduct to impose civil or criminal liability.
2.

The Woman's Constitutional Rights

Any attempt to regulate prenatal conduct necessarily involves consideration of a woman's rights to personal privacy, bodily integrity,' °° and procreative autonomy, as well as equal protection and procedural due process
rights. 0'1 The notion of a general constitutional right to privacy was articulated by Justice Brandeis in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.
Justice Brandeis advocated a broad reading of the fourth amendment to
prevent the government from intruding into an individual's privacy.' 0° He
articulated the individual's privacy as "the right to be left alone - the most
comprehensive of rights."' 13 The Court also broadly constructed the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment to uphold freedom of choice
in child rearing decisions.1°4 In Meyer v. Nebraska,0° the Supreme Court
held that parents had a constitutional right to the custody and care of their
children. Furthermore, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,0 6 the Court held that
the state must not unreasonably interfere with parents' liberty to rear and
nurture their offspring. With these decisions, the Court expanded the general
right of privacy articulated by Justice Brandeis to specific constitutional
guarantees.
These decisions laid the foundation for the Court to find a "right to
privacy," based on "penumbras" which emanated from the Bill of Rights.
In Griswold v. Connecticut,0 7 the Supreme Court struck down a statute
which forbade the use of contraceptives by a married couple. The majority

100. For cases upholding the right to bodily integrity and autonomy, see Union Pac. Ry.
v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891); Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 268, 104 N.W. 12,
14 (1905), overruled on other grounds, Genzel v. Halvorson, 248 Minn. 527, 80 N.W.2d 854
(1957). For more modern cases upholding the Constitutional right to privacy and bodily
integrity, see Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985); Superintendent of Belchertown State School
v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
101. For a discussion of the various constitutional and common law rights implicated, see
Nelson, supra note 84, at 745-62; Note, The Fetal Rights Controversy: A Resurfacing of Sex
Discrimination in the Guise of Fetal Protection, 57 UMKC L. REV. 261 (1989); Note,
Constitutional Limitations on State Intervention in Prenatal Care, 67 VA. L. REV. 1051 (1981)
[hereinafter Note, Constitutional Limitations); Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights Conflicts
with Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.
REV. 599, 614-24 (1986).
102. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
103. Id.
104. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
105. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
106. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
107. 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
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opinion concluded that the Bill of Rights protected privacy interests and
created a "zone of privacy."' °8 The Court held that the use of contraceptives
among married couples fell within this constitutionally protected zone of
privacy. 0 9 Thus, in Griswold, historical values of privacy were articulated
as constitutional guarantees."10 This initial guarantee of a married couple's
right to make choices regarding procreation led to additional protection of
privacy rights. Specifically, the Court subsequently recognized general privacy rights to procreation,"' contraception," 2 and a woman's right to an
abortion." 3 As the Court stated in Carey v. Population Services International,"14 "[tihe teaching of Griswold is that the Constitution protects
individual decisions in matters of childbearing from unjustified intrusion
by the state.""' 5 Additionally, the Court has concluded that in "matters
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and
child rearing and education . . . there are limitations on the States' power
to substantively regulate conduct." "16
The cases recognizing constitutional rights to privacy and autonomy stress
that whenever the government seeks to limit these fundamental rights, it
must establish a compelling state interest and it must demonstrate that the
means are necessary to achieve a permissible state policy." ' Furthermore,
the state must pursue means which are narrowly tailored."'
The recent decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services," 9 however, suggests that a woman's constitutional right to abortion may be
20
threatened. The Court indicated a willingness to overturn Roe v. Wade
and to adopt a new standard for abortion decisions. Instead of the strict

108. Id. at 485.
109. Id. at 485-86.
110. Griswold has been interpreted as articulating two distinct constitutional principles of
privacy. One principle is that an individual should be free from government intrusion into
home or family affairs. The second principle is that one has a right to autonomous decision
making regarding procreation. See Note, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 101, at 105661.
111. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
112. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (statute prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons invalidated).
113. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
114. 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1976).
115. Id.
116. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 n.26 (1977).
117. The court must apply strict scrutiny to any laws infringing on fundamental rights or
involving a suspect class. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 16
(1973) (state has a heavy burden of justification and the means must be precisely and narrowly
tailored); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (even though the purpose is legitimate,
the means must not "broadly stifle" fundamental liberties when the end can be more narrowly
reached); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940) (the power to regulate must not
unduly infringe on protected freedoms).
118. San Antonio Indep. School Dist., 411 U.S. at 16.
119. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
120. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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scrutiny approach, Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested that the Missouri
testing requirement is "reasonably designed to ensure that abortions are not
performed where the fetus is viable-an end which all concede is legitimateand that is sufficient to sustaih its constitutionality."'' This quote was
assailed by the dissent as a "newly minted standard . . . circular and totally
meaningless" and a novel test which "appears to be nothing more than a
dressed-up version of rational-basis review."' 22 Although there is concern
for the potential contraction of women's privacy rights in the abortion
context, the current law still upholds fundamental rights to privacy and
applies th strict scrutiny test to any state interference with those privacy
rights. Hence, any attempts to impose civil or criminal maternal liability
must be nirrowly tailored.' 23
Due process issues are also raised by any government attempt to impose
civil or criminal liability for a woman's prenatal acts. The due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment applies to any government action that
impairs an individual's life, liberty or property. 2 4 When the government's
action results in such an impairment, the government must assure adequate
hearing and process. 2 5 An attempt to take custody of a pregnant woman
to protect a fetus involves such an impairment, and presents the potential
for violation of a woman's due process rights.
In sum, several constitutional rights are involved in any attempt to regulate
prenatal conduct and impose maternal liability. While maternal rights may
conflict with fetal rights, there is no established rule that the state may
26
intervene and circumscribe these rights, especially if the fetus is nonviable.
3.

State Interests
Any state action infringing on an individual's constitutional rights must
be based on a permissible state interest. While the majority of commentators
121. 109 S. Ct. at 3058.
122. Id. at 5040.
123. The imposition of civil or criminal liability for a mother's prenatal negligence also
raises an equal protection issue. Specifically, because only a woman can become pregnant,
only a woman's life would be effected by excessive intrusion. Such equal protection issues
have already surfaced. For example, there are indications that pregnant women who are known
or suspected drug abusers have been more severely punished and incarcerated in jail for their
crimes.See Sherman, supra note 64, at I, col. I. The judges imposing the jail sentences have
openly admitted that if the women were not pregnant they might not have been incarcerated
for the crime.1d.
124. J. NOWAK, R.

ROTUNDA,

& J.

YOUNG,

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW

§ 13.2, at 453 (3d. ed.

1986).
125. Id. The use of infants' urinalysis tests to enable the state to take custody of newborns
in New York Nassau county has raised due process concerns. An attorney representing the
mothers who have lost custody of their infants asserts that the state has violated the women's
rights to privacy and due process by removing their newborns based on scant evidence and
without adequate opportunity to dispute the accusations. See Sherman, supra note 64, at 24,
col. 4.
126. For a discussion of why the state may not elevate the rights of the fetus over the
mother, see Annas, Forced Caesareans:The Most Unkindest Cut of All, 12 HASTINGS CENTER
REP., 16 (1982); Gallagher, supra note 2, at 9; Nelson, supra note 84, at 703 (1986).
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find the state has legitimate interests in the protection of the fetus, there is
27
no consensus on what these interests enable the state to do.
Roe v. Wade provided the foundation for determining whether the state
has a compelling interest to infringe on a woman's prenatal acts. Those
who argue that there is a legitimate state interest in protecting the fetus rely
on the balance the Roe Court articulated between the woman's right to an
abortion against the state interests of safeguarding maternal health, main"
taining medical standards, and protecting pobtential life. 28
' The Roe Court
held that when the fetus reaches viability, the state has a compelling interest
in protecting the potentiality of life. 2 9 Furthermore, the proponents maintain
that this state interest in the fetus is not just specific to regulating abortion,
but is instead a general interest in the potential well-being of the fetus. 30
Furthermore, legal scholars suggest that the state's interest in protecting
the fetus is consistent with the state's interest in the preservation of life and
the state's interest in youth. The interest in society's youth enables the state
to intervene to protect children's interests when their parents fail to do
so. ' This intervention is authorized by the state's police powers and its
parens patriae authority. This power allows the state a limited ability to
protect or promote the welfare of those who lack the capacity to act in
32
their own interests.
The Roe decision, however, does not provide the state with an absolute
interest in the protection of the fetus. Instead, the decision granted only an
interest limited by the mother's right to privacy and her own well-being.'

127. Some authors suggest the state should impose only civil liability, while others prefer
only the imposition of criminal liability. Some propose both.See sources cited supra note 2.
Furthermore, other authors recognize a state interest, but submit that the only appropriate
state action is a balancing test. See Note, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 101, at 1067.
However, some commentators contend there is no legal basis for concluding the state has a
legitimate overriding interest in the fetus that may circumscribe the woman's constitutional
rights. See Gallagher, supra note 2, at 749-62; Nelson, supra note 84, at 703.
128. See Myers, Abuse and Neglect of the Unborn, 23 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1984) ("Roe
makes clear that the state has substantial authority to protect fetal life"); Shaw, Conditional
Prospective Rights of a Fetus, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 63 (1984) (asserts that the inference of Roe
is that once a woman decides to carry a pregnancy to term not only is there a compelling
state interest, but that the woman incurs liability for any negligent harm inflicted upon the
fetus).
129. 410 U.S. 113, 162-63 (1973).
130. See Myers, supra note 128, at 18-24; Shaw, supra note 128, at 63. Commentators
supporting a state interest often rely on cases requiring pregnant women to submit to blood
transfusions for the benefit of the fetus, and the involuntary cesarean section cases as further
support for establishing a state interest in the preservation of fetal life. However, other
commentators believe that relying on the involuntary blood transfusion cases as basis for
allowing state intervention in the pregnant woman's life is inappropriate. See Annas, supra
note 126, at 17; Gallagher, supra note 2, at 26-27.
131. Myers, supra note 128, at 18-24.
132. Id.
133. See Nelson, supra note 84, at 757. The authors note that a pregnant woman who
refuses medical treatment has a strong personal interest in her bodily integrity. This interest,
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Some commentators, noting the courts' reluctance to authorize even minor
involuntary bodily intrusions, conclude that there is no strong support for
asserting that the state's interest in the fetus could allow forced medical
treatment of pregnant women. Rather, they conclude that the state's interest
in fetal life is not sufficient to overcome a woman's rights to privacy and
bodily integrity. However, conclusions that the state interest in the fetus is
strictly limited by the mother's rights to privacy and well-being conflict
with case law allowing the state to intervene to protect the fetus.
One such case is Jefferson v. Spalding County Hospital Authority. 3 4 In
Jefferson, the Georgia Supreme Court upheld a superior court order authorizing the county hospital to perform a cesarean upon the plaintiff in
the event she arrived at the hospital for delivery.' 35
The plaintiff suffered from placenta previa, but would not submit to a
cesarean because of religious beliefs. In the juvenile proceeding, the court
concluded that the fetus was entitled to the protection of the Juvenile Court
of Georgia and granted the state temporary custody of the fetus. The
mother was ordered to submit to an ultrasound exam, and if this exam
indicated that the placenta continued to block the birth canal, the mother
was to submit to surgery. 3 6 The Georgia Supreme Court concluded that the
intrusion into the life of the mother was outweighed by the state's compelling
37
interest in protecting the fetus.
Similarly, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld a lower
court order to perform an involuntary cesarean section on a twenty-six week
pregnant, terminally ill woman.' 38 However, while this court order was
upheld, and the woman was forced to have surgery, the order was later
vacated. In the vacating opinion, the appellate court concluded that when
a fetus becomes viable, the state has a compelling interest in protecting the
"potentiality of human life."1 9

the authors maintain, is supported by both common law and the Constitution. See also Annas,
supra note 126, at 16. Professor Annas agrees that Roe establishes a compelling state interest
in preserving the life of a viable fetus, but maintains that the state does not have such an
interest if the life or health of the mother is endangered. Id. at 17. Annas concludes that Roe
gives neither judges nor physicians the right to favor the life or health of the fetus over the
mother and that what constitutes the "health" of the mother is a broad concept. Id.
134. 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981).
135. Id. at 89, 274 S.E.2d at 460.
136. Id. at 88-89, 274 S.E.2d at 460.
137. Id. at 89, 274 S.E.2d at 460. The court did not address the issue of whether an unborn
child was a person for purposes of the Juvenile Protection Act. However, a concurring opinion
expressed the belief that the legislature intended the juvenile courts to exercise jurisdiction
only when a child had seen the "light of day." Id. at 92, 274 S.E.2d at 461-62 (Smith, J.,
concurring). Justice Smith concluded that he was aware of no "child deprivation" proceeding
wherein the "child was unborn." Id. at 92, 274 S.E.2d at 462.
138. In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611, 56 U.S.L.W. 299 (D.C. App. 1987), vacated, 539 A.2d 203
(D.C. App. 1988).
139. Id. at 614.
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Court orders imposing surgery for the benefit of the fetus, however, have
not always been upheld. In Taft v. Taft,140 the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts refused to uphold an order which required a woman to submit
to surgery to ensure that her pregnancy would go to term. The woman in
Taft was four months pregnant and refused to submit to the surgical
procedure based on her newly formed religious convictions. The supreme
court noted that the lower court judge failed to discuss the significance of
the woman's constitutional right to privacy.' 14 The court noted that the
record did not support the need for the operation and ,did not demonstrate
circumstances so compelling as to justify curtailing the woman's constitu42
tional rights. 1
C. Summary of Background
What circumstances, if any, justify a curtailing of a woman's constitutional rights is still largely an unanswered question. The consideration of
whether maternal civil liability should be imposed is complicated by many
unknown and conflicting variables. First, there is the virtual lack of precedent for imposing civil maternal liability in Illinois. Furthermore, while
the state of Illinois has a significant body of case law dealing with prenatal
negligence, the cases are all limited to third party liability.
Thus, while there is no factually consistent precedent, there is case law
addressing fetal rights, women's constitutional rights, and what constitutes
a compelling state interest. However, with the exception of the Supreme
Court decisions delineating women's constitutional rights, the case law is
inconsistent in its assessment of fetal rights and compelling state interests.
This uncertainty is reflected in the Illinois Supreme Court's conclusion in
Stallman v. Youngquist.

II.

THE

Stallman v. Youngquist

DECISION

143

a mother was sued for injuries her child
In Stallman v. Youngquist,
sustained in utero during a motor vehicle accident allegedly caused by her
negligence. The case was before the Circuit Court of Cook County and the
appellate court twice.

In Stallman v. Youngquist

J,144

the main issue on appeal was whether

plaintiff father's complaint asserting the mother's prenatal negligence stated
a cause of action. The appellate court held that a valid cause of action
existed. 45 The court recognized the existence of the parent-child tort immunity doctrine, but emphasized the trend of finding exceptions to the

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

388 Mass. 331, 446 N.E.2d 395 (1983).
Id. at 333, 446 N.E.2d at 396.
Id. at 335, 446 N.E.2d at 397.
125 II. 2d 267, 531 N.E.2d 355 (1988).
129 I11.App. 3d 862, 473 N.E.2d 400 (1st Dist. 1984).
Id. at 864, 473 N.E.2d at 404.
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doctrine.' 6 In particular, the court noted that in Schenk v. Schenk ,147
a
child was allowed to sue her father for his negligence in an automobile
accident. In recognizing this cause of action, the Schenk court reasoned
that the accident occurred outside the context of the family relationship
and was not directly connected with family purposes and objectives. 141
Relying on the Schenk decision, the appellate court concluded that if the
plaintiff could establish that the defendant's acts occurred outside the family
relationship, then the parent-child immunity doctrine would not apply. 41
Therefore, the court, concluded that the applicability of the immunity rule
was a question of fact and could not be decided on a motion to dismiss. 50
On remand, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. The
trial court found that the immunity doctrine did apply and granted the
motion for summary judgement. Plaintiff appealed, and, in Stallman v.
Youngquist H,"' the appellate court re-evaluated the parent-child immunity
doctrine and concluded that the three major justifications for parental
immunity did not withstand analysis.' 52 The three justifications were the
promotion of family harmony, the prevention of collusion, and upholding
of parental authority.' 53 The court concluded that these justifications for
parental immunity did not "withstand analysis in light of modern conditions."'5 4 Therefore, the parental tort immunity doctrine was abrogated and
the plaintiff was held to have a valid cause of action.' 55
The defendant appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court. The court concluded that there was a preliminary issue to be addressed before reaching
the parent-child tort immunity question. Specifically, the issue was whether
a cause of action by, or on behalf of, a fetus, subsequently born alive,
could be asserted against its mother for the unintentional infliction of
prenatal injuries. 5 6 The court refused to recognize such a cause of action,
thereby rendering any consideration of the parental immunity doctrine
unnecessary.'
in deciding this case of first impression, the court reviewed tort liability
for prenatal negligence by third persons."' The court stressed that all
previous case law involved a third person as defendant instead of the mother
of the plaintiff. 5 9 This was a crucial distinction for the court. The court

146. Id. at 862, 473 N.E.2d at 402.

147. 100 Il1. App. 2d 199, 241 N.E.2d 12 (4th Dist. 1968).
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assailed the Grodin court's lack of analysis in concluding that a mother
would bear the same liability as a third party for negligent conduct which
results in prenatal injury.' 60 The court maintained that the Grodin court
1 61
would "treat a pregnant woman as a stranger to her developing fetus.'
Furthermore, the court concluded that the Grodin court articulated a "legal
fiction" without addressing any of the profound implications such a concept
would entail. For these reasons, the court found the Grodin opinion un62
persuasive.
Next, the Stallman court addressed the common law notion of a "legal
right to begin life with a sound mind and body.' ' 63 The court noted that
this right emphasized that third party acts against pregnant women could
result in compensable injury to a fetus. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed
that a fetus should be allowed to recover against third parties. 64 However,
the court concluded that a defendant mother was different than any other
defendant in a prenatal action, and that this distinction necessitated a
different result. Specifically, the court stated that, "it would be a legal
fiction to treat the fetus as a separate legal person with rights hostile and
6
assertable against its mother."
The court conceded that if the fetus could assert a legal right to begin
life with a sound mind and body against its mother, then the mother would
have a legal duty to the fetus. 66 However, the court stressed that it was
not the law of Illinois that a fetus had rights which were superior to those
67
of its mother.
The Stallman court noted that if it recognized such a duty, then any
action which negatively effected fetal development would constitute a breach
of this duty. The court reasoned this recognition would result in an unprecedented intrusion into the privacy and autonomy of pregnant women.
Furthermore, the court stated that holding third party tortfeasors liable did
not interfere with the defendant's right to control her life, but that 'holding
a woman liable for her prenatal conduct invited state scrutiny into all her
decisions.168 Because the court refused to recognize that a fetus could assert
a right to begin life with a sound mind and body against its mother, 69 the
court concluded there could be no cognizable duty. Additionally, the court70
refused to recognize the fetus as a separate legal person from its mother.

160. Id. at 274-75, 531 N.E.2d at 358.
161. Id.
162. 125 II1. 2d at 274-75, 531 N.E,2d at 358.
163. Id. at 275, 531 N.E.2d at 359. See also supra notes 78-99 and accompanying text.
164. Id. at 272, 531 N.E.2d at 357-58. See also Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 I11.2d
368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973); Renslow v. Mennonite, 67 I11.2d 349, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977).
165. 125 111.2d at 278, 531 N.E.2d at 360.
166. Id. at 276, 531 N.E.2d at 359.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 275-76, 531 N.E.2d at 359.
170. Id. at 276, 531 N.E.2d at 359.
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The court recognized that early common law had erred in treating the fetus
as if it was only a part of the woman's body. However, the court stressed
it would not err in the opposite extreme by concluding that the fetus was
"entirely separate from its mother."'' 71
The Stallman court further explained why it should not recognize a
maternal legal duty. Specifically, the court indicated that there were other
factors besides foreseeability and causation that influenced the imposition
of a legal duty. 72 The court noted that it was foreseeable that any acts or
73
omissions by a pregnant woman could adversely effect fetal development.
However, the court relied on Prosser's conclusion that causation alone is
an inadequate basis for imposing duty. 17 4 Therefore, even though the injury
was foreseeable and the causation established, the court would not automatically impose a legal duty.
The Stallman opinion stressed that the determination of duty was a matter
of law, and that in this determination "the judiciary will exercise its
traditional role of drawing rationale distinctions, consonant with current
perceptions of justice between harms which are compensable and those that
are not.' 1 75 Thus, because of its far-reaching implications, the court refused
to recognize a common law maternal legal duty to a fetus. Instead, the
court deferred to the legislature as the more appropriate forum. The court
indicated that it in no way sought to minimize the public policy favoring
healthy newborns. It simply concluded that before-the-fact education of all
women and their families would be a more effective means of achieving
76
fetal health than the imposition of after-the-fact civil liability.
III.

ANALYSIS

The Stallman court, in reaching its decision, considered various competing
public policies. Among these policies were the preservation of a woman's
right to privacy and autonomy and the state's interest in the life, health
and welfare of the fetus. The result was an artfully vague opinion in which
the court held that a woman would not be civilly liable for her prenatal
conduct.
The Stallman decision provides hope both for women's rights and for
limiting tort liability. However, it is not a broad opinion, and it clearly
invites the legislature to consider if any legally cognizable duty should be
imposed on pregnant women. Nonetheless, the court makes some conclusions which could have a favorable impact on women.

171. Id. at 277, 531 N.E.2d at 359.
172. Id. (quoting Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401, 141718 (1961)).
173. Id. at 277, 531 N.E.2d at 359.
174. Id. at 277, 531 N.E.2d at 360.
175. Id. at 278, 531 N.E.2d at 360 (quoting Renslow v. Mennonite, 67 Ill. 2d 349, 358, 367
N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (1977)).
176. Id. at 280, 531 N.E.2d at 361.
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The court concluded that a fetus cannot be viewed as a completely separate
entity from its mother, that a fetus does not have an assertable "right to
be born whole" against its mother, and, in the absence of this "right to be
born whole," that a mother does not have a legal duty to the fetus. These
are the conclusions in Stallman, but each one is premised on important
public policy considerations with potentially broad impact.
A.

Analysis of Fetal Rights in Relation To Women's Rights

The conclusion that the fetus is not a separate entity, and therefore cannot
assert rights against its mother contains two interwoven concepts. The
Stallman court did not define the fetus as a person, but instead emphasized
7
that the fetus is completely dependent on the woman for its existence. 1
Specifically, the court stated that "it is the whole life of the pregnant
woman which impacts on the development of the fetus."' 17 8 Because of this
dependency, the court held the fetus was not a separate legal entity from
the woman. The court astutely noted that viewing the fetus as a separate
entity would create a legal fiction with far reaching implications. The end
result of this legal fiction would be that a pregnant woman's every action
could be subject to state scrutiny, thereby leading to unprecedented state
intervention.
If the Stallman court had imposed maternal civil liability, the end result
could have been excessive state intrusion into a pregnant woman's life. For
example, the imposition of civil liability would have inevitably led to the
imposition of maternal criminal liability.' 7 9 This criminal liability would be
intrusive, as it would enable the state to intercede to prevent a woman from
engaging in criminal prenatal conduct. Furthermore, the fact that a woman's
behavior could be so scrutinized, even for after-the-fact imposition of civil
liability, will have a chilling effect on women's rights to autonomy and
privacy.
In contrast to the Stallman decision's emphasis on limiting state scrutiny,
fetal rights proponents view far reaching state scrutiny as an acceptable and
necessary consequence of protecting fetal rights. This conclusion is based
on the belief that a fetus has a right to be born whole, and therefore a
mother is as liable for prenatal injury as a third party.8 0 These conclusions
are based on an alleged inevitable flow of logic.
The basic argument of the fetal rights proponents is that the courts have
historically increased the scope of a fetus's rights to recover for prenatal
injury, and that it is merely a logical progression that the mother should
be held liable. It is argued that early common law illogically prevented a
child from recovering for a prenatal injury on the belief that the fetus was
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merely a part of the mother.'' Bonbrest reversed this trend, and clearly
recognized that a fetus was not merely a part of the mother. Instead, the
Bonbrest court held the fetus was separate to the extent that an injury to
the mother could result in an injury to the fetus.' 2 Eventually, the Bonbrest
requirements for recovering for prenatal negligence were eroded. Thus,
currently in Illinois, a cause of action exists for prenatal negligence against
a third party tortfeasor regardless of whether the fetus is stillborn, is viable,
or is conceived at the time of the injury.
In increasing prenatal negligence liability, courts recognized a fetus's
"right to be born whole" as a basis for recovery against third parties.' 3
The "right to be born whole," in addition to the Roe v. Wade articulation
of a state's interest in the health of a viable fetus, has provided fetal rights
proponents with ammunition for arguing that a woman should be held
civilly and criminally liable for her negligent prenatal acts.
Citing the decisions recognizing prenatal negligence claims regardless of
live birth or viability, the court discussions of a fetus's "right to be born
8 4
whole," the recognition of a legitimate state interest in fetal well-being,
and the use of prenatal conduct as a basis for neglect proceedings,' the
fetal rights proponents argued that the hext logical step is that a fetus's
"right to be born whole" can be asserted against its mother. In reaching
this conclusion, proponents downplay the inescapable fact that a fetus and
woman are physically inseparable until birth. While no constitutional right
is absolute, and state intervention is permissible, the fetal rights proponents
express no concern for the potential, unbridled limitation of women's rights
that their position invites.
The Stallman court recognized the belief that a woman should subordinate
her right to control her life when she becomes pregnant.8 6 However, the
court stressed that it was not the law of Illinois that a woman's rights were
inferior to those of the fetus.8 7 Roe and Webster recognize that a state has
an interest in fetal well being and thus may regulate and limit a woman's
right to abortion. However, the imposition of civil and/or criminal liability
will have far greater effects on women's liberty than any abortion regulation,
and may result in the woman's rights being subjugated to the fetus's rights.
Allowing the imposition of maternal civil and/or criminal liability is tantamount to viewing the woman's rights as inferior to the fetus's rights.
Specifically, because every aspect of a pregnant woman's life has the
potential to harm the fetus, the woman's entire life is subject to state
scrutiny.
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It was this potential for unbridled state scrutiny that formed the basis
188
for the Stallman court not recognizing a woman's legal duty to her fetus.
The court expressly recognized that the creation of legal duties is a result
of the judicial and legislative processes and is not premised solely on the
variables of causation and foreseeability. 18 9 The Stallman court recognized
that determinations of legal duties are not based purely on logical arguments
in a sociopolitical vacuum.190 In rejecting the approach that suggests logic
dictates recognizing such a cause of action, regardless of public policy
concerns, the court stated, "[lI]ogic does not demand that a pregnant woman
be treated in a court of law as a stranger to her developing fetus."' 9'
Thus, the Stallman court did what the fetal rights proponents fail to do.
It considered the evolving line of cases dealing with prenatal negligence. It
analyzed their logical progression and then it viewed those cases in relation
to pregnant women and public policy concerns. It articulated the important
distinction between pregnant women and third party tortfeasors by recognizing that the imposition of liability on third parties did not interfere with
the defendant's right to control his or her own life. The same imposition
on pregnant women had a potential for a sweeping impact on their rights
to control their lives.
Thus, the court's primary focus was on the protection of the woman's
rights. However, the court did recognize that the state had a legitimate
interest in protecting the health and the welfare of the fetus. The court
indicated that this was also an important policy consideration. However, it
concluded that this goal could more appropriately be achieved through
preventive measures than after-the-fact imposition of civil liability. This
policy of promoting fetal well being is of course the primary concern of
fetal rights proponents. However, one may question, as the Stallman court
did, how imposing liability will really promote fetal well-being.
B.

Imposition of Maternal Liability Will Not Achieve Fetal Well-Being

The imposition of maternal civil liability will neither prevent fetal harm
nor promote fetal well-being because it is imposed post-injury. Furthermore,
such liability will rarely serve to compensate the child because in most cases
there will be no source for money damages. If the fetal injury occurs in an
accident caused by his or her mother's negligent driving, and she is also
injured, then the child will be able to collect his or her money damages
from the insurance company. However, in a case where a mother injures
the fetus, there will be no source for damages. Therefore, the imposition
of civil liability fails to satisfy its intended goals of promoting fetal wellbeing and/or compensating the injured child. The Stallman decision is not
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alone in recognizing that civil liability would be ineffective in promoting
fetal well-being. This conclusion is also reflected in the Missouri statute
that was contested in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services.192 In Webster, a statute which significantly limited a woman's ability to have an
abortion contained a preamble which articulated when human life began
and defined the fetal rights. 93 A plurality concluded that the preamble was
simply a reflection of the state's preference for childbirth over abortion
and that this was a value judgment the state was entitled to make. 94
Furthermore, Justice O'Connor concluded that any intimation that the
preamble was unconstitutional was purely hypothetical. 95 Some may suggest
that the Court's finding that the preamble was constitutional indicates the
Court's willingness to favor the fetus's rights over those of the mother.
Certainly, this is what the prochoice forces fear. However, while the Webster
decision may not bode well for women's rights, it is a mistake to interpret
this decision as suggesting that the state should impose maternal civil and
criminal liability.
Fetal rights proponents, however, may attempt to use this decision as
further support for imposing civil and/or criminal liability. The preamble,
though, does not support this conclusion. While the statute defines life as
beginning at conception, and declares that a fetus has rights, privileges and
immunities available to all other persons under the Constitution, it also
expressly states that the preamble should not be interpreted "as creating a
cause of action against a woman for indirectly harming her unborn child
by failing to properly care for herself or by failing to follow any particular
' 96
program of prenatal care."'
Most legal scholars recognize that the state has a legitimate interest in
promoting fetal well-being. This interest, however, does not necessarily lead
to the conclusion that women should be held liable for their prenatal acts.
The Stall/man decision was the first to articulate why this was not an
appropriate conclusion. However, since Stallman, the refusal to hold women
liable for their prenatal conduct has been further expressed. The Missouri
statute is one example. While the preamble's express intention was to declare
fetal rights and to enable the state to protect those rights, the statute
expressly rejected holding a woman liable for negligence for "indirectly
harming her unborn child." Thus, with the exception of Grodin, there is
no case which holds that a woman should be held civilly liable for her
negligent prenatal acts. Furthermore, no one has successfully prosecuted a
woman for her prenatal conduct. This further suggests that the case law
does not support promoting fetal well-being by imposing liability.
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The refusal to impose maternal criminal liability is also reflected in
public sentiment. A recent attempt in Illinois to impose criminal liability
on a woman for her prenatal conduct promoted much public debate. In
that case, a Rockford woman who abused cocaine was charged with the
death of her infant. The case engendered much public attention. Specifically, an editorial in the Chicago Tribune strongly criticized the State's
Attorney Office for prosecuting the woman.' 97 The editorial comment
recognized the important need for promoting fetal well-being, but it argued
that the goal could not be met by imprisoning women. This editorial was
just one rejection of such an approach. 198 In addition, the citizens of Illinois
joined in rejecting this approach by refusing to indict the women on
criminal charges.
The imposition of maternal criminal and civil liability is similar. The
goal in both circumstances is to promote fetal well-being, and the end
result in both is the restriction of women's rights. The legitimate and
important goal of protecting fetal well-being can be more readily achieved
through preventive prenatal programs. The Stallman decision recognized
that imposing maternal civil liability would not realistically improve fetal
well-being and would significantly infringe on women's rights. The state
has less restrictive means of achieving these goals, and is therefore required
to do so. The court in Stallman recognized that once it allowed maternal
civil liability, there would be no bright line to draw.
C.

Stallman and Previous Common Law

While the court's decision in Stallman may seem inconsistent with prior
case law, it is in fact consistent to the extent that prior case law is
applicable. 99 While proponents of maternal liability have relied on the
Renslow court's description of duty as neither "sacrosanct" or "static,"
such a fluid definition of duty can obviously be interpreted in two ways.
It can either lend force to imposing liability, or it can reject such liability
on the basis that any such duty is against public policy. The key is that a
nonstatic concept of duty suggests flexibility and emphasizes public policy
concerns.
The fetal rights theorists miscalculated the direction the Renslow opinion
would take. This miscalculation was based on a failure to heed the court's
warning that it would draw the line on expanding liability in the appropriate
case. The Stallman court concluded that the imposition of maternal civil
liability was the point at which such a line would be drawn. All previous

197. Cocaine babies: The real issue, Chicago Tribune, May 14, 1989, § 4, at 2.
198. See also Sherman, supra note 64, at 1, col. 1 ("jail is a ludicrous place to insure fetal
health"); Mother versus Child, 84 A.B.A.J., Apr. 1989, at 84; Note, The Pamela Rae Stewart
Case, supra note 2, at 9.
199. The Stallman opinion is consistent with Renslow's discussion of the articulation of
duty as a fluid concept. Furthermore, the Stallman opinion draws on language in Renslow
for the basis of limiting liability.
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Illinois case law, including Renslow, dealt with third party tortfeasors. In
Stallman, the court's clear distinction between third party tortfeasors and
a pregnant woman drew a demarcating line which limits the applicability
of prior case law.

To the extent that prior case law applies, Stallman is consistent. However,
as Stallman is a case of first impression, future courts will still encounter
novel issues, In these cases, public policy must direct the courts.
IV.

A.

IMPACT

Women's Rights Safeguarded

The court in Stallman v. Youngquist declined to impose civil liability on
a mother because of the potential for excessive state scrutiny into women's
everyday activities. Many commentators advocating maternal liability indicate that liability could be incurred for a vast array of conduct including
household accidents, motor vehicle accidents, maternal nutritional deficiencies, maternal drug ingestion, cigarette smoking, exposure to infectious
diseases, unwarranted use of amniocentesis, and immoderate exercise or
200
sexual intercourse during the last month of pregnancy.
This exhaustive list suggests the potential for extreme state intervention
and infringement of women's rights. As previously discussed, the imposition
of civil liability could result in excessive state intrusion. Furthermore, it is
likely that any imposition of civil liability will have a ripple effect. Once
the state holds women civilly liable for their prenatal acts, it becomes
merely a logical progression to hold women criminally liable. The imposition of criminal liability will invite additional state scrutiny and intervention into a woman's everyday life. 20' If the state can hold a woman
criminally liable, they may scrutinize her every act to determine if there is
20 2
any danger or damage to the fetus.

200. See Note, ParentalLiability, supra note 2, at 73-75.
201. In the Stewart case, the mother's sexual activity against doctor's orders, her alleged
use of illegal drugs during pregnancy, and her alleged failure to go to the hospital when heavy
bleeding began formed the basis for the state filing a misdemeanor charge against her. This
charge alleged that the mother failed to provide medical attention and remedial care to her
child. Note, The Pamela Rae Stewart Case, supra note 2, at 227. While this action was
unsuccessful, there are those who suggest that a woman's prenatal conduct should form the
basis for criminal prenatal abuse charges. Dr. Margery Shaw, a vociferous proponent of fetal
rights, believes that women who abuse illegal drugs while pregnant should be held criminally
liable for distribution of illegal drugs to the fetus. See Mother versus Child, supra note 198,
at 84.
202. In 1985, a judge in Waukesha County, Wisconsin ordered a pregnant teen-ager held
in a juvenile facility because she wasn't following her doctor's directions. A higher court ruled
the action was improper. See Mother versus Child, supra note 198, at 84. However, if
proponents for imposing criminal liability succeed, such actions could be upheld as a remedy
to deter criminal prenatal abuse. There are instances where judges have imprisoned pregnant
women who were abusing drugs under the guise of penalties for other offenses. Id. at 88.
However, one must question whether society wishes to adopt a social policy of imprisoning
women as means of achieving fetal well-being.
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The court's refusal to impose civil liability protects women's privacy
rights by avoiding the chilling effect such liability would impose and by
preventing further entrenchment of women's rights. This refusal to open
the door to civil liability suggests that the imposition of maternal criminal
liability for prenatal acts will not be forthcoming.
B.

Fetal Well Being Encouraged

Furthermore, while the court recognized the important state interest in
fetal well-being, it suggested that prevention may be the best approach.
This sociopolitical approach to the problem may encourage the legislature
to enact laws providing comprehensive prenatal care and drug rehabilitation
programs which will more effectively achieve fetal and child well-being.
V.

CONCLUSION

Medicine has long recognized the relationship between good prenatal
care and healthy newborns. Promoting fetal well-being is, and should be,
a state concern of significant proportion. Infant mortality rates remain
disturbingly high nationwide. 03 In Illinois, an infant mortality rate of 11.6
for every 1,000 live births placed it among the highest of the northern
industrial states. Chicago's infant mortality rate of 16.6 per 1000 live births
is higher than nearly every industrialized nation, and as high as many third
20 4
world countries. The rates are even higher among the black population.
There is little dispute that the state has an interest in promoting fetal
well-being. The question is, however, what is the most effective method of
achieving that goal? Increased availability of prenatal care and prenatal
care which encompasses a multidisciplinary approach is more likely to
achieve success in improving fetal outcomes.20
Furthermore, if criminal liability is imposed, the health care system could
become more of a police state than a system of providing care. A focus
that seeks to achieve fetal well-being by penalizing women may only result
in deterring women from seeking the prenatal care they so desperately
need. If fetal well-being is the ultimate goal, the state must focus on
providing the comprehensive prenatal care and education needed to realistically impact fetal well-being. The Stallman decision prevents imposing

203. First Steps to Improving Baby's Odds of Survival are up to Mom, Chicago Tribune,
Jan. 29, 1989, § 19, at 2, col. 5 (discusses Chicago and national infant mortality rates and
the problems that lead to such high infant death rates).
204. Id.
205. Local community centers may be able to combat infant mortality rates by providing

a multidisciplinary approach to prenatal care. One example of just such an attempt involves
a south side Chicago medical center. This clinic stresses comprehensive care as the solution

to the infant mortality problem. The clinic provides, in addition to medical services, a
nutritionist, social workers, chemical dependency counselors and dentists.See Good Care Starts
Before Birth, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 29, 1989, § 19, at 2, col. 3.
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civil liability and encourages a preventive approach. This approach properly
emphasizes fetal well-being while safeguarding a woman's rights.
Deborah Carroll

